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Dan Hockenmaier (Faire, Thumbtack, Reforge)09 October 2022

Developing a growth model + marketplace growth strategy

8Frameworks
15Insights

Frameworks in this episode

Insights & moments

The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.

Myth Buster· 2

Myth Buster23:30

"Our Best Users Do X" Almost Never Works

A common analytical failure mode is noticing that top users do some behavior and trying to push other users to do the same to drive retention. Dan puts little weight on these correlational exercises because something unique about that customer drives the behavior, and he's rarely been able to move a worse cohort into the better one.

  • The pattern 'best users do X, so make everyone do X' rarely drives retention
  • There's usually something unique about that customer or their experience causing it
  • Correlational analyses rarely move a low-value cohort into the high-value one
  • Focus instead on the real drivers of value and a strong first-run experience

one of the most common analytical failure modes is this pattern which is our best users do X so why can't we make other users…

Dan Hockenmaier · 23:30
#retention#analytics#data-science
Myth Buster50:30

Unbundling Marketplaces Is More Overhyped Than People Think

The recurring 'unbundling of Reddit/LinkedIn/Facebook' thesis rarely plays out because it over-focuses on UX improvement and under-focuses on the economics of scale, customer LTV and network effect. At Thumbtack, hundreds of verticalized competitors failed because Thumbtack could upsell across a thousand categories, giving it higher LTV and letting it outbid on SEM. Verticals only work when the sub-segment is very high frequency or high dollar value, or has a self-contained network like rig-up for blue-collar work.

  • The unbundling thesis over-values UX and under-values scale economics
  • Thumbtack's cross-category upsell gave higher LTV and won SEM bids against verticals
  • A vertical wins only if the sub-segment is very high frequency or high dollar value
  • GOAT and StockX carved out sneakers by solving trust/verification eBay couldn't
  • Self-contained networks (rig-up for blue-collar work) can escape LinkedIn's pull

broadly though I think that we over hyped the idea of unbundling

Dan Hockenmaier · 50:30

we could upsell customers into a thousand things and so our customer ltu is always higher and we would always win when we were bidding…

Dan Hockenmaier · 51:30
#marketplaces#unbundling#vertical#network-effects

Hot Take· 2

Hot Take00:00

Running a Marketplace Is Gardening, Not Construction

Dan's core mental model for operating a marketplace: unlike a SaaS product you build linearly, a marketplace is an ecosystem you don't fully understand. Changes to core incentives can trigger effects months later that are hard to trace back. The advice is to tread lightly, especially when something is already working.

  • SaaS = construction worker (linear building); marketplace = gardener (light touch)
  • A change in one place can drive a long-term effect two months later
  • Be very careful playing with core incentives or mechanisms, especially if the marketplace already works

if you think about running a Marketplace you're basically like a gardener you have to have a very light touch like if you're building a…

Dan Hockenmaier · 00:00

the main advice is like to tread lightly when you're messing with the core incentives or mechanisms of the marketplace be very careful particularly if…

Dan Hockenmaier · 41:30
#marketplaces#operating#incentives
Hot Take34:00

Demand Is the Currency; People Over-Rotate on Supply

Advice about marketplaces tends to over-focus on supply and under-focus on demand, because supply is the product early on and uses more of the product surface. But ultimately demand is the only thing that matters: aggregate the demand and suppliers will always say yes. You should still acquire supply, but only to the extent you understand how it impacts demand.

  • People over-rotate on supply and are under-focused on demand
  • Supply feels dominant early because it's the product and uses more product surface
  • If you aggregate demand, suppliers will always say yes to a profitable customer
  • Only acquire supply to the extent you understand its impact on demand (liquidity ceiling)

when you hear advice about where to focus people over rotate on Supply and actually are under focused on demand

Dan Hockenmaier · 34:00

demand is the currency and so when you think about trade-offs or how to optimize a business I think taking the perspective of the customer…

Dan Hockenmaier · 34:30
#marketplaces#demand#supply#strategy

Explainer· 5

Explainer06:00

A Growth Model Is Not a Forecasting Tool

A growth model is an analytical representation of how a business grows, usually in a spreadsheet, valuable because it is very hard to fake. Half the value comes simply from the act of building it, which forces real understanding. It is for opportunity assessment, not for replacing the finance team's forecast.

  • The model is 'very hard to fake' compared to talking about a business conceptually
  • 50% of the value is simply building it, because it forces you to understand the business
  • It is not a forecasting tool; output can be highly variable given the assumptions
  • Best used for opportunity assessment and weighing different bets

the analytical representation of how the business grows and is typically built in a spreadsheet which has a really nice feature of being very hard…

Dan Hockenmaier · 06:00

I think 50 of the value you get from it is simply building the model right like it forces you to understand it

Dan Hockenmaier · 06:30
#growth-model#strategy#analytics
Explainer26:00

Why Marketplaces Get Better as They Scale

Most businesses acquire marginally worse customers over time, so CAC rises and LTV falls. Marketplaces invert this: as supply liquidity improves, the experience improves, so later cohorts often see CAC go down and LTV go up. This compounding inversion is a key reason marketplaces fit the venture model.

  • Typical businesses: CAC rises and LTV falls as they scale
  • Marketplaces: improving liquidity means later cohorts see CAC fall and LTV rise
  • Hard and capital-intensive to start, but very hard to stop once rolling
  • Compounding defensibility is why they suit the venture model

Marketplace is actually the inverse like the supply liquidity is improving the experience is improving so often actually as you see later cohorts and marketplaces…

Dan Hockenmaier · 26:00
#marketplaces#unit-economics#network-effects
Explainer29:30

Liquidity: Until You're Liquid, Nothing Else Matters

Liquidity measures how reliably the marketplace lets people do the thing they came to do, ideally expressed in a dimension the customer cares about, like Uber wait time or a commerce search-to-fill rate. There's often a magic threshold (around four or five minutes for rideshare) where it clicks. Until a marketplace is liquid, nothing else matters, which is why the advice is to cut scope to one geography or category first.

  • Liquidity = how often a buyer or seller can do what they came to do
  • Express it in a dimension customers care about (wait time, fill/conversion rate)
  • Rideshare has a magic moment around four-to-five-minute wait times
  • Cut scope to a specific geography or category to generate liquidity before scaling

there's some Magic Moment around four or five minutes where it really clicks

Dan Hockenmaier · 29:30

essentially until you have a liquid Marketplace really nothing else matters and so this should be the primary thing you're focused on defining

Dan Hockenmaier · 30:00
#marketplaces#liquidity#metrics
Explainer56:00

Fragmentation Is Why Most B2B Marketplaces Fail

B2B marketplaces are rarer partly because there are fewer founders who understand B2B pain, but the deeper reason is lower fragmentation. You need fragmentation for a good marketplace: the more concentrated either side is, the more leverage those players have, the less they need you, and the less they'll pay in commission. High per-transaction dollar amounts also invite disintermediation, since a supplier will just pick up the phone to save tens of thousands.

  • Fragmentation = number of businesses in a space relative to transaction volume
  • If 10 companies do 80% of volume, they have their own sales teams and need the marketplace less
  • Concentrated sides pay lower commissions and are prone to disintermediation
  • High dollars per transaction make going around the marketplace worth it (unlike a $2-3 rideshare commission)

the more concentrated either side of your Market is the more leverage they have the less likely they are to need you and the less…

Dan Hockenmaier · 56:00
#marketplaces#b2b#fragmentation#commission
Explainer58:30

The Future of Marketplaces: Rising Commissions and the Exit From Marketplace Mode

Charting commission against founding year shows a clear up-and-to-the-right trend: newer marketplaces charge more and do more work to justify it. The evolution runs from 1.0 demand aggregators (Zillow, HomeAdvisor) to managed marketplaces that generate trust (Airbnb, Etsy) to heavily managed ones that own part of the value chain (DoorDash logistics, Faire underwriting). At 100% commission you're no longer a marketplace, so the question is which businesses evolve out of the model entirely.

  • Newer marketplaces charge higher commissions and do more work to justify them
  • 1.0 = lead-gen demand aggregation (Zillow, HomeAdvisor), ~5-10% commission
  • Managed = trust generation (Airbnb, Etsy); heavily managed = owning value chain (DoorDash, Faire)
  • The determining variable is how much creativity/differentiation the space needs from suppliers
  • Commoditized spaces (rideshare with autonomous vehicles) consolidate out of marketplace mode; creative ones (Etsy, Amazon, Faire) stay

newer marketplaces are charging higher commissions and they're doing more work to justify those commissions

Dan Hockenmaier · 59:00

ultimately you're charging 100 commission and you're not a Marketplace anymore

Dan Hockenmaier · 1:00:30
#marketplaces#future#commission#strategy

Story· 1

Story22:00

Fix the Unlucky First Week: The Uber Driver Example

The biggest retention wins usually come from inflecting the early user experience, not messaging people who are about to churn. Dan uses a rideshare driver who, by luck of the draw, earns a bad hourly rate in their first week and quits, wrongly assuming that's how the platform works. Streamlining and homogenizing that first experience lifts below-average starts to average and improves retention curves.

  • Biggest retention wins come from the earliest lifecycle, not months later
  • Look for variability: which new customers are having a bad experience but shouldn't be
  • A driver with an unlucky low-density or cancelled first week assumes that's the norm and leaves
  • This is why Uber and Lyft compete on guaranteed first-week/first-month earnings

some of them just by luck of the draw are going to make a pretty bad hourly rate because like customer canceled on them or…

Dan Hockenmaier · 22:00

that driver doesn't know that's not how it works they might think we just I just make three dollars an hour on this platform and…

Dan Hockenmaier · 22:30
#retention#onboarding#marketplaces#rideshare

Takeaway· 5

Takeaway16:00

Growth Is More Sensitive to Retention Than You'd Guess

One of the first things a growth model reveals is that growth is far more sensitive to retention than intuition suggests, because a healthy retained base feeds referrals, content, and contribution margin. A small retention gain often beats a bigger change elsewhere, meaning teams frequently misallocate product and growth resources.

  • Retention interacts with referral rate, content generation, and contribution margin
  • A smaller percentage gain on retention often beats a larger change in another area
  • Companies may be significantly misallocating product and growth resources as a result

your growth is much more sensitive to customer retention than you can ever into it

Dan Hockenmaier · 16:00
#retention#growth-model#prioritization
Takeaway24:30

Don't Chase Churned Users Before Exhausting New Ones

Teams are tempted by resurrection because a huge pool of churned users looks like easy upside. But that pool has already tried the product and decided against it, so they're hard to convince. New users are usually higher leverage; wait to spin up resurrection until earlier-funnel efforts are exhausted.

  • The churned pool is the group that tried the product and chose not to use it
  • Winning them back is very hard; new users are usually higher leverage
  • Delay resurrection efforts until earlier funnel opportunities are exhausted

the problem is that pool of users is the group of people who has tried the product and decided they don't want to use it…

Dan Hockenmaier · 24:30
#retention#growth#prioritization
Takeaway32:00

Share of Wallet Is Depth, and Depth Beats Breadth

Share of wallet is how much of a buyer's or seller's total activity in a space runs through your marketplace. Dan would take a 10% GMV lift from deepening current customers over the same lift from new customers, because depth signals future retention and defensibility and makes multi-tenanting less likely.

  • Share of wallet = the portion of a buyer's or seller's total spend/activity you capture
  • Higher share of wallet lowers the odds a customer multi-tenants on a rival
  • It's a measure of depth rather than breadth
  • 10% more wallet from current customers beats 10% GMV from new ones

I think it's basically a measure of depth rather than breadth and I will take depths every time in a Marketplace

Dan Hockenmaier · 32:30
#marketplaces#metrics#retention
Takeaway43:30

When Expanding, Adjacency Beats TAM

For marketplaces in massive markets, the size of an adjacent market matters very little because any of them could inflect the business. What matters is how adjacent it is (a proxy for whether you can actually win it) and whether it accentuates your network effect by reusing the same supplier or serving the same customer's demand, as Uber Eats does.

  • Beyond a point, TAM matters little; all the adjacent bets are big enough to inflect the curve
  • Prioritize adjacency as a proxy for whether your current model will work there
  • Instacart into convenience stores fits its model better than traditional retail
  • Accentuate the network effect: Uber Eats reuses drivers and serves the same customers

actually be on a certain point Tam are the size of the market actually matters very little because these are all big enough that they…

Dan Hockenmaier · 43:30

for Uber it makes all the sense in the world to have ubereats because one they're the same drivers in many cases but two the…

Dan Hockenmaier · 44:00
#marketplaces#expansion#network-effects#strategy
Takeaway45:00

Don't Let Go-To-Market Get Ahead of Product

Because liquidity is a race, marketplaces often pour money into go-to-market and incentives to bootstrap a new market. Dan has learned repeatedly that the real winner is whoever delivers an incredible end-to-end customer experience first, even for a smaller number of customers, because that creates the flame that lets you expand. Keep product and go-to-market in lockstep.

  • Spending big on GTM and incentives to bootstrap liquidity matters but isn't the main thing
  • The winner delivers a great end-to-end experience first, even for fewer customers
  • A loved experience creates retention, word of mouth, and a base to expand from
  • Don't let go-to-market get too far ahead of product

it's who can deliver an incredible end-to-end customer experience first even if for a smaller number of customers because that's what creates the flame

Dan Hockenmaier · 45:30

don't let go to market get too far ahead of product you need to keep those two pieces in lockstep as you're expanding

Dan Hockenmaier · 45:30
#marketplaces#expansion#product#go-to-market